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into their computerized counterparts, creating
multiple points of failure. The right approach,
instead, is often to redesign the processes so that
they can take advantage of the technology. But it
is easier said than done. To see why, we have to
look beyond systems and processes and focus on
the human factors.
In a financial institution, we are in the busi-
ness of making money. We fine-tune our reward
structure in such a way that our core business
(of making money, that is) runs as smoothly as
possible. Smooth operation relies on strict
adherence to processes and the underlying poli-
cies they implement. In this rigid structure,
there is little room for visionary innovation.
This structural lack of incentive to innovate
results in staff hurrying through a new system
rollout or a process reengineering. They have
neither the luxury of time nor the freedom to
slack off in the dreaded “business-as-usual” to do
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T
o err is human, but to really foul
things up, you need a computer. So
states the remarkably insightful
Murphy’s Law. And nowhere else
does this ring truer than in our
financial workplace. After all, it is
the financial sector that drove the rapid progress
in the computing industry – which is why the
first computing giant had the word “business” in
its name. 
The financial industry keeps up with the
developments in the computer industry for one
simple reason. Stronger computers and smarter
programs mean more money — a concept we
readily grasp. As we use the latest and greatest in
computer technology and pour money into it, we
fuel further developments in the computing
field. In other words, not only did we start the
fire, we actively fan it as well. But it is not a bad
fire; the positive feedback loop that we helped set
up has served both the industries well. 
This interdependency, healthy as it is, gives us
nightmarish visions of perfect storms and dire con-
sequences. Computers being the perfect tools for
completely fouling things up, our troubling night-
mares are more justified than we care to admit.
Models versus systems
Paraphrasing a deadly argument that some gun
aficionados make, I will defend our addiction to
information technology. Computers don’t foul
things up; people do.
Mind you, I am not implying that we always
mess it up when we deploy computers. But at
times, we try to massage our existing processes
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Revamp the system?
Brother, can you spare the
time?
^a thorough job of such “nonessential” things.
Besides, there is seldom any unused human
resource to deploy in studying and improving
processes so that they can better exploit technol-
ogy. People who do it need to have multifaceted
capabilities (business and computing, for
instance). Being costly, they are much more opti-
mally deployed in the core business of making
more money. 
Think about it, when is the last time
you (or someone you know) got hired to
revamp a system and the associated
processes? The closest you get is when
someone is hired to duplicate a system
that is already known to work better
elsewhere. 
The lack of incentive results in a
dearth of thought and care invested in
the optimal use of technology.
Suboptimal systems (which do one
thing well at the cost of everything else)
abound in our workplace. In time, we
will reach a point where we have to bite
the bullet and redesign these systems.
When redesigning a system, we have to
think about all the processes involved.
And we have to think about the system
while designing or redesigning process-
es. This cyclic dependence is the theme
of this article.
Systems do not figure in a quant’s
immediate concern. What concerns us
more is our strongest value-add – name-
ly, mathematical modeling. In order to
come up with an optimal deployment
strategy for models, however, we need to
pay attention to operational issues like
trade workflow.
I was talking to one of our top
traders the other day, and he men-
tioned that a quant, no matter how
smart, is useless unless his work can be
deployed effectively and in a timely
manner. A quant typically delivers his
work as a C++ program. In a rapid
deployment scenario, his program will
have to plug directly into a system that
will manage trade booking, risk meas-
urements, operations, and settlement.
The need for rapid deployment makes it essential
for the quants to understand the trade lifecycle
and business operations.
Life of a trade
Once a quant figures out how to price a new
product, his work is basically done. After coaxing
that stochastic integral into a pricing formula
(failing which, a Crank–Nicholson or Monte
Carlo), the quant writes up a program and moves
on to the next challenge. 
It is when the trading desk picks up the pric-
ing spreadsheet and books the first trade into the
system that the fun begins. Then the trade takes
on a life of its own, sneaking through various
departments and systems, showing different
strokes to different folks. This adventur-
ous biography of the trade is depicted in
Figure 1 in its simplified form. 
At the inception stage, a trade is
conceptualized by the front office folks
(sales, structuring, trading desk –
shown in yellow ovals in Figure 1).
They study the market need and poten-
tial, and assess the trade viability. Once
they see and grab a market opportuni-
ty, a trade is born.
Even with the best of quant models,
a trade cannot be priced without mar-
ket data, such as prices, volatilities,
rates and correlations, and so on. The
validity of the market data is ensured
by product control or market risk peo-
ple. The data management group also
needs to work closely with information
technology (IT) to ensure live data
feeds.
The trade first goes for a counter-
party credit control (the pink bubbles
in Figure 1). The credit controllers ask
questions like: if we go ahead with the
deal, how much will the counterparty
end up owing us? Does the counterpar-
ty have enough credit left to engage in
this deal? Since the credit exposure
changes during the life cycle of the
trade, this is a minor quant calculation
on its own. 
In principle, the front office can do
the deal only after the credit control
approves of it. Credit risk folks use his-
torical data, internal and external cred-
it rating systems, and their own quanti-
tative modeling team to come up with
counterparty credit limits and maxi-
mum per trade and netted exposures. 
Right after the trade is booked, it
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Figure 1. Life of a trade
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goes through some control checks by the middle
office. These fine people verify the trade details,
validate the initial pricing, apply some reason-
able reserves against the insane profit claims of
the front office, and come up with a simple yea or
nay to the trade as it is booked. If they say yes, the
trade is considered validated and active. If not, the
trade goes back to the desk for modifications.
After these inception activities, trades go
through their daily processing. In addition to the
daily (or intra-day) hedge rebalancing in the front
office, the market risk management folks mark
their books to market. They also take care of com-
pliance reporting to regulatory bodies, as well as
risk reporting to the upper management — a
process that has far-reaching consequences. 
The risk management folks, whose work is
never done, as Tracy Chapman would say, also
perform scenario, stress-test, and historical value-
at-risk (VaR) computations. In stress tests, they
apply a drastic market movement of the kind
that took place in the past (like the Asian curren-
cy crisis or 9/11) to the current market data and
estimate the movement in the bank’s book. In
historical VaR, they apply the market movements
in the immediate past (typically last year) and fig-
ure out the 99th percentile (or some such prede-
termined number) worst loss scenario. Such
analysis is of enormous importance to the senior
management and in regulatory and compliance
reporting. The activities of the risk management
folks are depicted in blue bubbles in Figure 1. 
In their attempts to rein in the ebullient
traders, the risk management folks come across
at their adversarial worst. But we have to remind
ourselves that the trading and control processes
are designed that way. It is the constant conflict
between the risk takers (front office) and the risk
controllers (risk management) that implements
the risk appetite of the bank, as decided by the
upper management.
Another group that crunches the trade num-
bers every day from a slightly different perspec-
tive is the product control folks, shown in green
in Figure 1. They worry about the daily profit and
loss (P/L) movements, both at trade and portfolio
level. They also modulate the profit claims by the
front office through a reserving mechanism and
come up with the so-called unrealized P/L. 
This P/L, unrealized as it is, has a direct
impact on the compensation and incentive struc-
ture of front office in the short run. Hence, the
perennial tussle over the reserve levels. In the
long term, however, the trade gets settled and the
P/L becomes realized, and nobody argues over it.
Once the trade is in the maturity phase, it is the
finance folks that worry about statistics and cash
flows. Their big-picture view ends up in annual
reports and stake holder meetings, and influ-
ences everything from our bonus to the CEO’s
new Gulfstream.
Trades are not static entities. During the
course of their life, they evolve. Their evolution is
typically handled by middle office people (the
gray bubbles in Figure 1), who worry about trade
modifications, fixings, knockins, knockouts, and
so on. The exact name given to this business unit
(and, indeed, other units described above)
depends on the financial institution we work in,
but the trade flow is roughly the same.
The trade flow that I have described so far
should ring alarm bells in a quant heart. Where
are the quants in this value chain? Well, they are
hidden in a couple of places. Some of them find
home in the market risk management, validat-
ing pricing models. Some others may live in cred-
it risk, estimating peak exposures, figuring out
rating schemes, and minimizing capital charges. 
Most important of all, they find their place
before a trade is ever booked. Quants teach their
home banks how to price products. A financial
institution cannot warehouse the risk associated
with a trade unless it knows how much the prod-
uct in question is worth. It is in this crucial sense
that model quants drive the business.
In a financial marketplace that is increasingly
hungry for customized structures and solutions,
the role of the quants has become almost unbear-
ably vital. Along with the need for innovative
models comes the imperative of robust platforms
to launch them in a timely fashion to capture
transient market opportunities. 
In our better investment banks, such plat-
forms are built in-house. This trend towards self-
reliance is not hard to understand. If we use a
generic trading platform from a vendor, it may
work well for established (read vanilla) products. It
may handle the established processes (read com-
pliance, reporting, settlements, audit trails, etc.)
well. But what do we do when we need a hitherto
unknown structure priced? We could ask the ven-
dor to develop it. But then, they will take a long
time to respond. And, when they finally do, they
will sell it to all our competitors, or charge us an
arm and a leg for exclusivity, thereby eradicating
any associated profit potential.
Once a vended solution is off the table, we are
left with the more exciting option of developing
an in-house system. It is when we design an
inhouse system that we need to appreciate the
big picture. We will need to understand the
whole trade flow through the different business
units and processes, as well as the associated
trade perspectives.
Trade perspectives
The perspective that is most common these days
is trade-centric. In this view, trades are the pri-
mary objects, which is why conventional trading
systems keep track of them. Put a bunch of trades
together, and you get a portfolio. Put a few portfo-
lios together, and you have a book. The whole
entity of global markets is merely a collection of
books. This paradigm has worked well and is
probably the best compromise between different
possible views.
But the trade-centric perspective is only a
compromise. The activities of the trading floor
can be viewed from different angles. Each view
has its role in the bigger scheme of things in the
bank. Quants, for instance, are model-centric.
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The lack of incentive results in a dearth of
thought and care invested in the optimal
use of technology
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They try to find commonality between various
products in terms of the underlying mathemat-
ics. If they can reuse their models from one prod-
uct to another, potentially across asset classes,
they minimize the effort required of them.
Remember how Merton views the whole world as
options! I listened to him in amazement once
when he explained the Asian currency crisis as
originating from the risk profile of compound
options — the bank guarantees to corporate
clients being put options, government guaran-
tees to banks being put options on put options. 
Unlike quants, who develop pricing models,
quantitative developers tend to be product-cen-
tric. To them, it doesn’t matter too much even if
two different products use very similar models.
They may still have to write separate code for
them, depending on the infrastructure, market
data, conventions, and so on.
Traders see their world from the asset class
angle; typically associated with a particular trading
desk based on asset classes, their favorite view cuts
across models and products. To traders, all products
and models are merely tools for making profit.
IT folks view the trading world from
a completely different
perspective. Theirs is
a system-centric view,
where the same prod-
uct, using the same
model, appearing in
two different systems,
is basically two differ-
ent beasts. This view is not
particularly appreciated by
traders, quants, or quant
developers.
One view that all of us
appreciate is the view of the
senior management, which
is narrowly focused on the
bottom line. The big boss-
es can prioritize things
(whether products,
asset classes, or sys-
tems) in terms
of the money
they bring to the
shareholders. Models and trades are typi-
cally not visible from their view — unless, of
course, rogue traders lose a lot of money on a par-
ticular product or by using a particular model.
Or, somewhat less likely, they make huge profits
using the same tricks.
When the trade reaches the market risk folks,
there is a subtle change in the perspective from a
trade-level view to a portfolio-or book-level view.
Though mathematically trivial (after all, the dif-
ference is only a matter of aggregation), this
change has implications in the system design.
Trading systems have to maintain a robust hierar-
chical portfolio structure so that various dicing
and slicing, as required in the later stages of the
trade life cycle, can be handled with natural ease.
The busy folks in the middle office (who take
care of trade validations and modifications) are
obsessed with trade queues. They have
a validation queue, market operation
queue, and so on. Again, the manage-
ment of queues using status
flags is 
something we 
have to keep in mind
while designing an
inhouse system.
When it comes to
finance folks and
their notions of cost
centers, the trade is
pretty much out of
the booking system.
Still, they manage
trading desks and
asset classes cost
centers. Any trad-
ing platform we
design has to provide
adequate hooks in the sys-
tem to respond to their specif-
ic requirements as well. 
Quants and the big picture
Most quants, especially at junior levels, despise
the big picture. They think of it as a distraction
from their real work of marrying stochastic cal-
culus to C++. Changing that mindset to some
degree is the hidden agenda behind this column. 
As my trader friends will agree, the best
model in the world is worthless unless it can be
deployed. Deployment is the fast track to the big
picture — no point in denying it. Besides, in an
increasingly interconnected world, where a
crazy Frenchman’s actions instantly affect our
bonus, what is the use of denying the existence of
the big picture in our nook of the woods?
Instead, let’s take advantage of the big picture to
empower ourselves. Let’s bite the bullet and sit
through a “Big Picture 101.” 
When we change our narrow, albeit effective,
focus on the work at hand to an understanding of
our role and value in the organization, we will see
the potential points of failure of the systems and
processes. We will be prepared with possible solu-
tions to the nightmarish havoc that computer-
ized processes can wreak. And we will sleep easier. 
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